《参考消息》摘选的文章，爱不释手。
［加拿大《环球邮报》１月８日］以自己微薄之力保护中国古迹 （记者杰弗里•约克发自中国同里）
加拿大百万富翁多年挽救险些被拆毁和倒塌的中国古老建筑的同时，中国各地却在不断地进行毁坏。可以归结出众多理由，但在现阶段中国社会整体对人文文化意识态度，同一个外国人进行的强烈对比，彰显出不同的效果。
从黄出发，附以中国部分古建筑的现状，最后通过一位上海学者不痛不痒的话语来表明目前的主流意识，结尾是观点，亦是现状。
［美国《时代》周刊１月４日一期文章］尼克松主义的回归 （作者 外交学会资深会员彼得•贝纳特）
开篇亮明主题。第二自然段讲起历史，当时的尼克松主义具体实施状况。第三自然段自然说到近日的索马里，（1.4文章出炉不久，美军即突袭索马里南部“基地”组织成员藏匿地）。第四自然段，范围扩大到全球内的外包主义，阿富汗于北约，朝鲜于中国，达尔富尔于非洲联盟，伊朗于以色列，伊拉克于马利基总理。第五自然段，首先肯定这种外包有一定道理，但也要付出代价。第六自然段，外包在其他地方出现的问题。第七自然段，历史当中原版的尼克松方义最后的结局。第八自然段，用笔谨慎地对现行政策进行解释，又对未来进行展望。
同历史进行对比文章，历史和现状不可避免地需要进行比较，而对于未来进行的展望，有时基于目前事件正处于进行期，或其它原因，未来亦可通过历史结局或者现状预想给出结果。历史－现状搭配，范围由具体到全部，作用和反作用。
行文范本。
附：Return of the Nixon Doctrine
TIME Thursday, Jan. 04, 2007 By PETER BEINART
It's an unwritten rule: each president gets one foreign policy doctrine. James Monroe's was defense of the Americas. Harry S Truman's was containment. And George W. Bush's--spelled out after the defeat of the Taliban in 2002--was pre-emptive war to defeat terrorism and spread democracy.
To a lot of people, it sounded good at the time. The country was united, the military was triumphant, the mood was resolute. Americans were ready, literally, to take on the world.
Now it sounds crazy. The military is cracking from wartime strain. Isolationism is on the rise. Americans don't want to sustain one pre-emptive war, let alone start others.
And so the Bush Administration has begun cribbing from a very different doctrine: Richard Nixon's. The Nixon Doctrine is the foreign policy equivalent of outsourcing. Nixon unveiled it in 1969 to a nation wearied by Vietnam. No longer would Americans man the front lines against global communism. In Vietnam, we would turn the fighting over to Saigon. In the Persian Gulf, we would build up Iran to check Soviet expansion. America would no longer be a global cop; it would be a global benefactor, quartermaster and coach--helping allies contain communism on their own.
Now President Bush is trying something similar. For much of 2006, Administration officials fretted about Somalia, where some of the ruling Islamists had terrorist ties. Next door in Djibouti, America stations around 1,000 troops. But instead of sending them in, we turned to Ethiopia, Somalia's neighbor and longtime rival. When the Ethiopian military rolled into Mogadishu and sent the Islamists fleeing last week, the Bush Administration kept a low profile, applauding the invasion and thanking its lucky stars that it was Ethiopia that launched it, not us.
It's becoming a familiar story. In Afghanistan, the U.S. has handed over much of the anti-Taliban fight to NATO. On North Korea, America works largely through China. On Darfur, we have banked on peacekeepers from the African Union. This past summer the Bush Administration briefly put Israel in charge of our Iran policy, supporting Jerusalem's war against Hizballah in hopes of crippling Tehran's powerful Lebanese ally. And in Iraq the U.S. is relying more and more on Nouri al-Maliki to defeat the insurgents, disarm the militias and give us a way out.
All this outsourcing makes some sense. Bogged down in Iraq, America simply can't intervene as aggressively--militarily or even diplomatically--as we could a few years ago. But there are costs too. When America relies on other countries to do our bidding, they often end up doing their own instead. Ethiopia may capture some terrorists, but it is also making a play for dominance in Africa's horn. Somali Islamists have already vowed to wage guerrilla war against the country's new occupiers. If Ethiopia tries to make Somalia its puppet, it could spur a nationalist insurgency backed by archrival Eritrea. And that could spark a regional war.
Outsourcing has created problems elsewhere as well. Some of America's NATO partners won't send their troops to Afghanistan's dangerous south. On North Korea, China has put enough pressure on Pyongyang to make it resume talks on its nuclear program but not nearly enough to make those talks go anywhere. Finally, while the Bush Administration cheered on Israel last summer as it destroyed Hizballah encampments from the air, the bombing campaign virtually destroyed Lebanon's pro-Western government as well--wrecking what was once a crown jewel in Bush's campaign for Middle East democracy.
The original Nixon Doctrine didn't turn out that well either. When American troops left, South Vietnam crumbled. The Shah of Iran, America's bulwark against Soviet meddling in the Persian Gulf, used the threat of communist subversion to establish a dictatorship. A few years later, the ayatullahs were in power.
In the short run, we may have little choice but to outsource parts of our foreign policy. But in the longer term, America will pay dearly for its inability to lead. The return of the Nixon Doctrine is one of the hidden costs of the war in Iraq. And it is another reason that, unless Iraq's leaders quickly forge a political compact across sectarian lines, America must leave. When that happens, U.S. policymakers will be able to scan the globe anew, with more time and resources at their command. Then the U.S. can abandon the Nixon Doctrine once and for all.
Beinart is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
文章标题有独特的作用，但每次的post标题却煞费脑筋。
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