2006年10月05日

400米*3
10分钟

很慢的。

2006年09月23日

风也过,雨也过。

谨此纪念。

2006年05月15日

考完了。

回来了。

2005年12月22日

珠峰哲理的经济分析 为王石序








稿









西






怀



亿 亿
亿







— —
— —




访







便




穿 西















— — — —









— —

2005年10月17日

再过几天就是我老婆的生日了。

按照娘家的习俗,结婚的第一年的生日,是要和她一起过的。

但是没有能够再一起。

她在北京,我在深圳。

想念她。

我想你对她说:老婆,我爱你,祝你生日快乐!

这首歌我反复听了很多次。

老婆,下次见到你了一起听。

here withou you

http://218.57.9.12/games.sina.com.cn/movie040527/wow/Without2_sina.wmv


A hundred days had made me older

since the last time that I’ve saw your pretty face



A thousand lights had made me colder and I don’t think I can look at this the same



But all the miles had separate

They disappear now when I’m dreaming of your face



I’m here without you baby

but your still on my lonely mind

I think about you baby

and I dream about you all the time

I’m here without you baby

but your still with me in my dreams

And tonight it’s only you and me



The miles just keep rollin

as the people either way to say hello

I’ve heard this life is overrated

but I hope that it gets better as we go



I’m here without you baby

but your still on my lonely mind

I think about you baby

and I dream about you all the time

I’m here without you baby

but your still with me in my dreams

And tonight girl it’s only you and me



Everything I know,

and anywhere I go

it gets hard but it won’t take away my love

And when the last one falls,

when it’s all said and done

it get hard but it won’t take away my love



I’m here without you baby

but your still on my lonely mind

I think about you baby

and I dream about you all the time

I’m here without you baby

but your still with me in my dreams

And tonight girl it’s only you and me



2005年08月23日

这是一段比较重要的历史。
作者比较了美国建国时期从独立宣言到立宪选举第一位总统,用来8年的时间。
而且宪法回避了一个重要的问题——奴隶制——该问题导致了南北战争。

伊拉克的立宪会怎么样?

作者不看好,我也不看好。

在最后,作者说,要防止伊拉克内战是布什政府的当务之急啊。



参见:
Philadelphia 1787 vs. Baghdad 2005
Bush’s lousy analogy.
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Friday, Aug. 19, 2005, at 2:05 PM PT


When things go particularly badly in Iraq—anarchy,
insurgency, and now the delays in crafting a constitution—President
George W. Bush and his top aides point reassuringly to the turbulence
surrounding our own Founding Fathers’ exertions to forge a republic.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
first sought solace in history back in March 2003, only weeks after
Saddam Hussein was toppled. America in the 1780s, he noted, was marked
by "chaos and confusion … crime and looting … popular discontent." "Our
first effort at a governing charter—the Articles of
Confederation—failed miserably," he added, "and it took eight years of
contentious debate before we finally adopted our constitution and
inaugurated our first president."

President Bush
picked up on the theme, in nearly identical terms, in a speech just
last May: "The American Revolution was followed by years of chaos. …
Our first effort at a governing charter, the Articles of Confederation,
failed miserably. It took several years before we finally adopted our
Constitution and inaugurated our first President. … No nation in
history has made the transition from tyranny to a free society without
setbacks and false starts."

Continue Article


In
other words, so this argument goes, the United States of America took
11 years to go from the Declaration of Independence to the
Constitution; therefore, don’t be surprised that Iraq is still writhing
a mere two years after the fall of Saddam—or that the delegates to its constitutional convention are experiencing difficulties.

There’s something to this, of course, but why does Bush keep bringing it up? Far from easing our concerns about Iraq (ah, well, this is just how things go in the transition to democracy), comparing its plight with that of late 18th-century
America—and likening the roundtable in Baghdad’s Green Zone to the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia—should only intensify the
hackles and horrors.

The real inference to be drawn is that the
American colonies were as well-fit for a democratic union as any
society in human history—and they took more than a decade to
get their act together. Today’s Iraq enjoys almost none of their
advantages, so how long will it take to move down the same path—and how
long will we have to stay there to help?

Let us count just a few of the obstacles.

  • A
    major dispute at both constitutional conventions was how to divide
    power between the central government and the regional provinces. But in
    the American case, the provinces—i.e., states—were well-established
    political units, with governors, statutes, and citizens who identified
    themselves as, say, New Yorkers or Virginians. There are no comparable
    authorities, structures, or—in any meaningful sense—constituents in
    Iraq’s regions (except, to some degree, in the Kurdish territories, and
    many people there want simply to secede).
  • America’s Founding
    Fathers shared the crucible of having fought in the Revolutionary War
    for the common cause of independence from England. This bond helped
    overcome their many differences. Iraq’s new leaders did not fight in
    their war of liberation from Saddam Hussein. It would be as if France
    had not merely assisted the American colonists but also fought all the
    battles on the ground, occupied our territory afterward, installed our
    first leaders, composed the Articles of Confederation, and organized
    the Constitutional Convention. The atmosphere in Philadelphia, as well
    as the resulting document and the resulting country, would have been
    very different.
  • America had a natural first president in George
    Washington, the commanding general and unblemished hero of the
    Revolutionary War. Amid the climate of political brawls and duels that
    make current tabloid fare seem tame, Washington was the one figure who
    could not be criticized, whose decisions were accepted by all. Had
    Washington rejected politics and retired to his estate, the union—and
    the Constitution that enshrined it—would have fallen apart. Perhaps if
    Ahmad Chalabi—the Pentagon’s handpicked Washington wannabe—had led a
    few brigades into Baghdad, his prospects would have brightened.
  • Among
    America’s Founding Fathers, Thomas Jefferson wrote the Declaration of
    Independence. James Madison and Alexander Hamilton aligned the
    principles of the Constitution with the Enlightenment tenets of
    property, law, and individual rights. Islam may not be incompatible
    with democracy, but Locke and Montesquieu take you there more directly.
  • Sectarianism
    did not exist in early America. Yes, there were sharp regional
    differences between mercantile New England and the agrarian South, as
    well as moral splits over slavery. But no groups exacerbated these
    tensions by asserting an exclusive claim on God.
  • Early America
    saw armed revolts, notably Shays’ Rebellion and the Whiskey Rebellion.
    But they were protests led by debt-ridden farmers against rising
    taxes—not pervasive or murderous insurgencies against the entire
    established order. They were also put down fairly promptly—Shays’ by a
    state militia, the Whiskey Rebellion by a mere show of government force.

There is one comparison between the two conventions that holds out some hope for Iraqi prospects—if they manage it shrewdly.

The
Philadelphia convention nearly broke down over the issue of
slavery—just as the Baghdad roundtable may do so over the question of
Islamic law. The Southern American states were so dependent on slavery
that their delegates (who were almost all slave-owners) refused even to
negotiate over the practice’s survival.

In Iraq, many Shiites—who
have finally acquired the power that goes with majority status—insist
that Islam assume a central role in the new nation’s social and
political life. This idea is bitterly opposed by Sunnis, who feel
suddenly disempowered, and the northern Kurds, who tend to be more
secular and who have grown accustomed to autonomy.

The American
delegates punted their problem by agreeing that no amendment to ban
slavery would be so much as considered until at least 1808. Some
observers are now suggesting that the Iraqis do much the same with the
question of Islamic law—defer the issue until later and, meanwhile, let
each region or province find its own way.

There are those who
oppose a deferral, noting that the Philadelphia evasion unraveled,
triggering the Civil War of 1861-65. I would say this: If the Baghdad
delegates hammer out a deal that might spark an Iraqi civil war 74 years
from now, they should sign it at once. The bigger worry—which Bush’s
analogies to the American Constitution do nothing to address—is how to
avoid civil war in the coming months.



2005年08月18日

 明  说:
张五常说的游戏规则,和我说的考核机制是一回事哎

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
讲讲看

 明  说:
他的那本经济解释:需求,供给,和制度,我刚把 需求看完,菜完成三分之一

 明  说:
游戏规则的目的还是财富怎么创造和分配的问题,考核机制也是这个意思

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
同意

 明  说:
游戏规则啊,考核机制啊,其实都是技术层面的

 明  说:
他们体现的是一个社会的价值取向

 明  说:
简单地说,就是鼓励什么,不鼓励什么。

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:


 明  说:
核心价值观

 明  说:
才是主心骨

 明  说:
核心价值观的关键是自由和民主

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
自由我同意 民主不好说

 明  说:
核心价值观的实质就是允许不同价值观的存在,保证基本物质条件

 明  说:
实质就是让受害个体有权益保护

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:


 明  说:
实质就是让受害人一定要有权利和物质条件申述

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
民主的精粹我认为是保护少数派

 明  说:
一个人不当得益的另一面一定是另外人不当失益。

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
同你说的一样

 明  说:
保证不当失益者,和压制不当得意者是一回事

 明  说:
其实,最后归结的结果是

 明  说:
世界观

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
是价值观

 明  说:
有些人觉得这个世界是动物世界,就是弱肉强食

 明  说:
有些人则追求自由和平等

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
我的意见是允许所有的人按照自己的意愿发展

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
哪怕他的意愿是上街乞讨,也应该同意

 明  说:
问题的关键是,你的意见作不到,因为不同人的意愿是冲突的

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
至于尊不尊重,是另外一回事

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
是冲突

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
不同的人有不同的价值观

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
当泥采遇到孔子的时候就会说:我是流氓,我要把你杀了

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
我估计孔子也没有办法

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
甘为鱼肉

 明  说:
价值观的冲突到实际中会反映为利益和权利的冲突。

 明  说:
孔子肯定不买帐啊,如果他是一个独立存在的人

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
问题是不同的价值趋向会有不同的行动标准

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
比如泥采 就可能锻炼身体 当好流氓

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
孔子则不一定(实际中的他很厉害)

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
所以打架肯定是泥采这一派赢 这就是

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
原因

 明  说:
是啊,打架就是规则

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
丛林规则

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
动物世界

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
把人降低到动物世界

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
君子所不为

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
君子不得不接受

 明  说:
混和规则

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
无奈的选择

 明  说:
不是无奈的选择,而是无奈的结果

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
最关键的是 如果你想更高一个层次,比如制定规则 你就要考虑所有的可能

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
是 无奈的结果

 明  说:
是啊,你要允许狼吃羊

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
但一旦你发现可以吃羊 你就不会选择去做羊了

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
所以规则的制定者 应该是上帝

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
应该超然物外

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
不然的话,我推测,真实世界中的规则一定是丛林规则

 明  说:
是的,我早说过,奴隶的悲哀不是要推翻奴隶制,而是渴望成为奴隶主。

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
哈哈 说的好 严重同意

 明  说:
说白了,这个世界就一个规则,丛林

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
大家选择自己喜欢的动物当当

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
如果你跑的快 可以考虑当羚羊
 
_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
也可以生存

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
有的人也许天生不是肉食动物 我说是也许 不是说意愿

 明  说:
是的,肉食取决于出身、能力和意愿、

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
我这样说也不全对,如果所有的人都想当狮子,可是最后都会饿死

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
同意

 明  说:
我感觉自己象素食的鲨鱼

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
哈哈

 明  说:
问题是这个世界存在与否不重要。

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
我以前不相信社会会解体,瓦解 现在相信

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
我以前总是觉得社会同文明有区别

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
现在在会死亡这个点上 没有区别

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
所以同意 你说的

 明  说:
文明只是美好设想和偶然的结果

 明  说:
文明不是必然

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:

 明  说:
社会的起源,实际上应该是丛林规则的结果

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
应该是

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
说一个现实的问题 当素食的鲨鱼也不容易

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
生存问题

 明  说:
从人与自然的关系来看,社会是人与其他动物竞争的法宝

 明  说:
从人与人的关系来看,社会是一些人与其他人竞争的法宝

 明  说:
两个层面来看,都是丛林规则,不同的地方是社会是合作竞争

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
技术上讲 是这样

 明  说:
所谓,斗争和合作不矛盾就是这个道理

 明  说:
素食的鲨鱼好辛苦啊

 明  说:
你知道不会捕食要被同行笑话的

 明  说:
甚至被猎物笑话

曹松涛_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
说的好
 
_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
不错 是这样

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
请允许我将刚才的聊天在我个人的blog上发表

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
呵呵

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
不行我就偷偷发表啦

 明  说:
可以啊

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
好 多谢

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
版权问题

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
通常 我是不保留聊天记录的

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
不过今天的例外

_"曾平生之志,不为温饱“ 说:
完全例外 还要发表

2005年08月15日

做过很多研究,甚至还用别人的名义出了一本关于银行公司治理的书。

但是我承认对公司治理研究的是在是不够。

为什么?

什么是真正的公司治理?

如何保护股东的利益,尤其是小股东的利益,只有自己才能够保护自己的利益。公司治理其实是权利斗争。
别人不会保护你的利益,只有你自己会保护自己的利益。



那种机制是最好的公司治理?

第一:利益落实到个人,责任落实到个人。

第二:惩罚机制(严厉的法律,刑法,严刑峻法才可以)。


还有一个更深层次的问题,即当利益落实到个人,责任也落实到个人时,个人的信用问题。
个人的信用问题很重要,但是个人的信用能不能够支撑现代企业制度?或者说资本主义的生产方式?
我不知道。

在国内个人信用的扩张的极限在哪里?为什么民营企业长不大,总是出问题?

产权的问题重要吗?
个人的信用是什么?
支撑现代化生产方式的信用又是什么?

金融企业更加重要。


其实,价格机制和排队机制没有什么不同。都是资源配置的一种表现。
经济学课本告诉我们说,价格机制优于排队机制。价格机制能够正确的引导资源配置。
功能是让资源在它最有价值的地方发挥作用,产生最高的价值。所以是可取的。



我承认经济学教材的理论,我也是这么走过来的。
可是我心底里有一丝的不喜欢。

价格机制是通过高价吓走穷人(象我这样的人),然后让有钱的人在很短的时间内买到某物品(比如石油)。排队机制是通过高昂的时间成本(也是价格之一)来吓走富人,因为他们的时间成本很高,石油对他们的物质成本比较低。但是穷人的时间成本很低,所以他们喜欢排队。今天早上(8月15日,抗战日本投降日,留此存照,纪念一下),我看到《南方都市报》a05版说东莞500的士凌晨拥加油战,不禁心里有点暗喜,又有点暗忧。喜的是穷人能够用上油,忧的是富人可能不喜欢。还有一忧,经济理论告诉我这样不大对头。可是我又想说,经济理论评什么就能够证明富人就是生产率较高的人呢?尤其是在当前的中国,个人的富裕不是通过人力资源的租值获得(象李嘉诚那样),而很多是通过关系的租值,政策的租值获得的。
现实世界是灰色的。我不喜欢。理论是简单的,我喜欢。但是简单的理论要经过复杂的蹂躏才可以用(张五常语)。


sen(拿诺奖的那个森)在它饥荒研究中,说印度人为什么饥荒,不是因为世界粮食生产不够,而是因为美国的政策(如耕地休耕,农民保护)政策造成粮食的价格过高,印度农民买不起粮食,所以饥荒。看到这些(所谓学术),我不禁叹一口气。如果欧洲不向左转,森能得诺奖吗?做梦吧。


价格机制能正确配置资源,所以在长期中使经济增长最大化?

可是人是自私的,价格也有误导,股票市场就是这样。这也能使增长速度最大化?

除非你告诉我,价格机制误导这在整个经济事件集中,它的测度为零,那我就服了你!

我对此表示怀疑。

用于记录下来我的一点想法。

经济周期的起因:各种冲击。
技术冲击,新技术引发的投资。
自然界的冲击,比如自然灾害。
成本冲击:如石油价格。(全世界范围内存在吗?值得怀疑。一国范围捏存在)
政策的冲击:错误的政策,或者不合时宜的政策。


对于冲击影响经济机制的理解:
学派一:市场会自动调整,会回复到新的均衡。
学派二:存在各种粘性(价格的、工资的、资本市场的?),和信息不对称,调整的速度比较慢。
调整的过程比较痛苦。


对于应用:政策有用论和无用论。