这是一段比较重要的历史。
作者比较了美国建国时期从独立宣言到立宪选举第一位总统,用来8年的时间。
而且宪法回避了一个重要的问题——奴隶制——该问题导致了南北战争。

伊拉克的立宪会怎么样?

作者不看好,我也不看好。

在最后,作者说,要防止伊拉克内战是布什政府的当务之急啊。



参见:
Philadelphia 1787 vs. Baghdad 2005
Bush’s lousy analogy.
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Friday, Aug. 19, 2005, at 2:05 PM PT


When things go particularly badly in Iraq—anarchy,
insurgency, and now the delays in crafting a constitution—President
George W. Bush and his top aides point reassuringly to the turbulence
surrounding our own Founding Fathers’ exertions to forge a republic.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
first sought solace in history back in March 2003, only weeks after
Saddam Hussein was toppled. America in the 1780s, he noted, was marked
by "chaos and confusion … crime and looting … popular discontent." "Our
first effort at a governing charter—the Articles of
Confederation—failed miserably," he added, "and it took eight years of
contentious debate before we finally adopted our constitution and
inaugurated our first president."

President Bush
picked up on the theme, in nearly identical terms, in a speech just
last May: "The American Revolution was followed by years of chaos. …
Our first effort at a governing charter, the Articles of Confederation,
failed miserably. It took several years before we finally adopted our
Constitution and inaugurated our first President. … No nation in
history has made the transition from tyranny to a free society without
setbacks and false starts."

Continue Article


In
other words, so this argument goes, the United States of America took
11 years to go from the Declaration of Independence to the
Constitution; therefore, don’t be surprised that Iraq is still writhing
a mere two years after the fall of Saddam—or that the delegates to its constitutional convention are experiencing difficulties.

There’s something to this, of course, but why does Bush keep bringing it up? Far from easing our concerns about Iraq (ah, well, this is just how things go in the transition to democracy), comparing its plight with that of late 18th-century
America—and likening the roundtable in Baghdad’s Green Zone to the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia—should only intensify the
hackles and horrors.

The real inference to be drawn is that the
American colonies were as well-fit for a democratic union as any
society in human history—and they took more than a decade to
get their act together. Today’s Iraq enjoys almost none of their
advantages, so how long will it take to move down the same path—and how
long will we have to stay there to help?

Let us count just a few of the obstacles.

  • A
    major dispute at both constitutional conventions was how to divide
    power between the central government and the regional provinces. But in
    the American case, the provinces—i.e., states—were well-established
    political units, with governors, statutes, and citizens who identified
    themselves as, say, New Yorkers or Virginians. There are no comparable
    authorities, structures, or—in any meaningful sense—constituents in
    Iraq’s regions (except, to some degree, in the Kurdish territories, and
    many people there want simply to secede).
  • America’s Founding
    Fathers shared the crucible of having fought in the Revolutionary War
    for the common cause of independence from England. This bond helped
    overcome their many differences. Iraq’s new leaders did not fight in
    their war of liberation from Saddam Hussein. It would be as if France
    had not merely assisted the American colonists but also fought all the
    battles on the ground, occupied our territory afterward, installed our
    first leaders, composed the Articles of Confederation, and organized
    the Constitutional Convention. The atmosphere in Philadelphia, as well
    as the resulting document and the resulting country, would have been
    very different.
  • America had a natural first president in George
    Washington, the commanding general and unblemished hero of the
    Revolutionary War. Amid the climate of political brawls and duels that
    make current tabloid fare seem tame, Washington was the one figure who
    could not be criticized, whose decisions were accepted by all. Had
    Washington rejected politics and retired to his estate, the union—and
    the Constitution that enshrined it—would have fallen apart. Perhaps if
    Ahmad Chalabi—the Pentagon’s handpicked Washington wannabe—had led a
    few brigades into Baghdad, his prospects would have brightened.
  • Among
    America’s Founding Fathers, Thomas Jefferson wrote the Declaration of
    Independence. James Madison and Alexander Hamilton aligned the
    principles of the Constitution with the Enlightenment tenets of
    property, law, and individual rights. Islam may not be incompatible
    with democracy, but Locke and Montesquieu take you there more directly.
  • Sectarianism
    did not exist in early America. Yes, there were sharp regional
    differences between mercantile New England and the agrarian South, as
    well as moral splits over slavery. But no groups exacerbated these
    tensions by asserting an exclusive claim on God.
  • Early America
    saw armed revolts, notably Shays’ Rebellion and the Whiskey Rebellion.
    But they were protests led by debt-ridden farmers against rising
    taxes—not pervasive or murderous insurgencies against the entire
    established order. They were also put down fairly promptly—Shays’ by a
    state militia, the Whiskey Rebellion by a mere show of government force.

There is one comparison between the two conventions that holds out some hope for Iraqi prospects—if they manage it shrewdly.

The
Philadelphia convention nearly broke down over the issue of
slavery—just as the Baghdad roundtable may do so over the question of
Islamic law. The Southern American states were so dependent on slavery
that their delegates (who were almost all slave-owners) refused even to
negotiate over the practice’s survival.

In Iraq, many Shiites—who
have finally acquired the power that goes with majority status—insist
that Islam assume a central role in the new nation’s social and
political life. This idea is bitterly opposed by Sunnis, who feel
suddenly disempowered, and the northern Kurds, who tend to be more
secular and who have grown accustomed to autonomy.

The American
delegates punted their problem by agreeing that no amendment to ban
slavery would be so much as considered until at least 1808. Some
observers are now suggesting that the Iraqis do much the same with the
question of Islamic law—defer the issue until later and, meanwhile, let
each region or province find its own way.

There are those who
oppose a deferral, noting that the Philadelphia evasion unraveled,
triggering the Civil War of 1861-65. I would say this: If the Baghdad
delegates hammer out a deal that might spark an Iraqi civil war 74 years
from now, they should sign it at once. The bigger worry—which Bush’s
analogies to the American Constitution do nothing to address—is how to
avoid civil war in the coming months.




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